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1. Introduction 
Mathematical analysis as we know it today is based almost entirely on two-valued logical 
systems in which every proposition is either true or false, with no gradation of truth allowed. 
However, this restriction is mitigated to some extent by allowing probability qualification, that is, 
assertions of the form: The probability that proposition p is true is cy, where 01 is a number in 
the inter& [0, 11. 
The successes of mathematical analysis in science have led to an almost unquestioned 
assumption that the combination of two-valued logic and probability theory is all that is needed, 
especially in those branches of science, e.g., physics, chemistry, astronomy, analytical mechanics, 
control theory, etc., in which the systems under analysis are well-defined in the sense that their 
behavior may be described by a family of integro-differential or difference equations in which the 
stochastic components, if any, have known or measurable probability distributions. But what is 
questionable is the adequacy of two-valued-logic-based mathematics for the social sciences and, 
more generally, for the analysis of systems in which human judgment, perception, and emotions 
play an important role. The problem with such systems is that they are much too ill-defined to 
admit of characterization within any mathematical framework which is based on two-valued logic. 
This holds, in particular, for systems encountered in such fields as economics, psychology, sociol- 
ogy, medicine, etc. It is true that even in these fields, as in most fields of science, respect and 
recognition is accorded to those who create quantitative theories within the classical paradigm. 
But the extent to which such theories are relevant to real-world problems is a debatable thesis 
which cannot be supported in the affirmative if one expects a theory to have a predictive value. 
Viewed against this background, fuzzy logic may be regarded as an alternative to two-valued 
logical systems-an alternative which aims at providing a model for modes of reasoning which are 
approximate rather than exact. Thus, in fuzzy logic, which is basically a generalization of mul- 
tivalued logic, truth is not only a matter of degree-as it is in multivalued logic-but, more 
importantly, a fuzzy degree. The same applies to quantifiers, probabilities, possibilities and, more 
generally, to everything else. In this way, that is, by abandoning the concept of two-valuedness, 
fuzzy logic acquires the capability to model cognitive phenomena which are too complex or too 
ill-defined to be amenable to analysis by traditional means. 
There is a branch of fuzzy logic, namely, dispositional logic, which is of particular relevance 
to the commonsense mode of reasoning which underlies our ability to communicate and make 
rat,ional decisions in an environment of uncertainty and imprecision. Since classical predicate 
logic is not effective in such environments, a number of attempts have been made during the past 
decade to extend it in ways which would make it possible to address at least some of the problems 
which are associated with commonsense reasoning and, in particular, the problem of exceptions. 
The best known of the methods in this spirit are circumscription (3), nonmonotonic reasoning (4), 
and default reasoning (5). 
The methods in question have played an important role in improving our understanding of 
commonsense reasoning and knowledge representation. However, based as they are on two-valued 
logic, they do not provide a framework for inference when the premises are fuzzy and/or are 
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associated with fuzzy probabilities-which is characteristic of the premises representing common- 
sense knowledge. In this setting, dispositional logic provides an alternative system of inference 
based on fuzzy logic which is capable of addressing the issues of uncertainty and imprecision in 
the context of commonsense reasoning and knowledge representation. In what follows, we shall 
outline the conceptual structure of dispositional logic and provide a sketch of some of its main 
features. A more detailed exposition of a related theory of dispositions may be found in (7). 
2. Dispositionality and Usuality 
The point of departure in dispositional logic is the concept of a disposition, that is, a propo- 
sition which is preponderantly but not necessarily always true. For example, birds can fly is a 
disposition, as are the propositions smoking is harmful, Swedes are blond, flying is safe, young 
men like young women, and it takes about an hour to drive from Berkeley to Stanford. Most 
dispositions are of the form A is B or A’s are B’s, where A and B are fuzzy predicates, as in 
smoking is harmful and Swedes are blond. (Note that to be a Swede is a matter of degree.) 
Expressed in these forms, a disposition signifies that the conditional probability of B given A is 
high, where high should be interpreted as a fuzzy probability. 
In more concrete terms, a disposition may be expressed in one of two canonical forms: 
(4 unconditional: 
usually (X is A) (1) 
and (b), conditional: 
usually (X is A if Y is B), (2) 
where X and Y are variables, A and B are fuzzy predicates, and usually is a fuzzy quantifier 
which may be represented as a fuzzy number in the interval [0, I]. In (1) A is a usual value of 
X, while in (2) B is a usual value of X conditioned on Y is B. Propositions of the form (1) and 
(2) are said to be usuality-qualified. In most cases, the quantifier usually in such propositions is 
implicit rather than explicit. As an illustration, the disposition snow is white may be represented 
in an unconditional form as 
usually (Color (Snow) is white). 
Similarly, the conditional proposition snow is white if it is fresh may be expressed as 
usually (Color (Snow) is white if Snow is fresh), 
where Color (Snow) plays the role of X; white the role of A; Snow the role of Y; and fresh the 
role of B. Note that in this case X is a function of Y. 
The meaning of a disposition which is expressed in its unconditional form may be defined as 
follows (6). Assume for simplicity that X is a random variable which takes the values ‘ui, . . . , un 
with respective probabilities pi, . , pn. Then, (1) may be interpreted as a constraint on the vec- 
tor P = (P,, . . . , P,), with the degree, 7, to which p satisfies the constraint given by 
r=p wmlly(CiPillA(Ui)), i=l,..., n I (3) 
and 
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in which ~~~~~~ is the membership function of the fuzzy number usually. 
More generally, in the case of a conditional disposition, let pii and pj denote, respectively, 
the joint probability that X = ui and Y = uj, and the probability that Y = vj, i,j = 1, , n. 
Then, the degree, r, to which the constraint on pij and pi is satisfied is given by 
Cij Pij (p,(‘i) A ILg(‘j)) 
I 1 I ’ 
(4) 
Cj pjl-LB(‘j) 
in which the argument of ,LL~~~~,, is the conditional probability of the fuzzy event X is A given the 
fuzzy event Y is B. 
Another important concept in dispositional logic is that of a subdisposition, exemplified by 
slimness is attractive. In this case, it would not be correct to interpret the proposition in ques- 
tion as most of those who are slim are attractive. A more accurate interpretation would be that 
the conditional probability that a slim person is attractive is significantly higher than the uncon- 
ditional probability that a person is attractive. More specifically, if a subdisposition is expressed 
as a conditional proposition of the form X is A if Y is B, then the relative increase, p, in the con- 
ditional probability of A given B may be expressed as 




To say that the conditional probability P(A I B) is significantly higher than P(A) is roughly 
equivalent to saying that the ratio p in (5) is a fuzzy number which is greater than or equal to 
medium, which in turn is a fuzzy number close to 0.5. Under this assumption, the degree, r, to 
which a given subdisposition constrains pij and pj may be expressed as 
I 
P(A I B) - P(A) 
7=/I P 
I l-P(A) ’ 
(6) 
in which P(A I B) and P(A) are given by 




‘(A) = ciPi~,(ui), ‘=1,...,12 , 
where pi is the probability that X = ZL~. 
In dispositional logic, the concepts of a disposition and subdisposition as defined above pro- 
vide a point of departure for the construction of a system of inference from commonsense 
knowledge. In this system, the techniques of fuzzy logic are employed to express commonsense 
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knowledge in the form of usuality-qualified propositions exemplified by (1) and (2). Then, the 
deductive apparatus of both dispositional and fuzzy logic is called upon to provide answers to 
queries relating to the information stored in a database containing dispositions, subdispositions, 
and possibly other types of factual data. 
The form of inference rules in dispositional logic may be illustrated by two basic rules: (a) 
the dispositional conjunctive rule; and (b) the dispositional modus ponens. These rules may be 
stated as follows. 
The dispositional conjunctive rule 
usually (X is A) 
usually (X is B) 
(8) 
(2 usually 0 1) (X is A n B) 
where A n B denotes the intersection (or conjunction) of A and B, and the fuzzy quantifier 
2 usually Q 1 is a fuzzy arithmetic expression in which 8 denotes the operation of subtraction in 
fuzzy arithmetic (2). As is generally true of deductions in dispositional logic, the fuzzy quantifier 
in the conclusion is less specific than the fuzzy quantifiers in premises. (What this means is that, 
viewed as a fuzzy subset of the unit interval, the fuzzy number usual1 is a subset of 2 UHL- 
ally @ 1.) 
The dispositional modus ponens 
usually (X is A) 
usually (Y is B if X is A) 
(9) 
usually2 (Y is B) 
where usually2 is the product of usually with itself in fuzzy arithmetic. As in the case of the 
dispositional conjunctive rule, the fuzzy quantifier usually2 is less specific than usually. 
Simple examples of (8) and (9) are the following: 
usually (Age (ProJessor) is not very young) 
usually (Age (Projessor) is not very old) 
(2 usually 8 1) (Age (Professor) is not very young and not very old) 
usually (Pressure is high) 
usually (Volume is low i/ Pressure is high) 
usually2 (Volume is low) 
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Concluding remark. Although we have focused our attention in this note on the concept of 
dispositionality in the context of commonsense reasoning, its implications are much broader. 
Indeed, as we develop a better understanding of human reasoning we may discover that 
dispositionality-in its diverse manifestations-plays a key role in the remarkable human abi1it.y 
to make rational decisions in an environment of uncertainty and imprecision. 
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